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1 INTRODUCTION 
Consideration of change is one of the prerequisites 
of a proactive safety management system. Anticipa-
tion of opportunities and threats induced by change 
or innovation is one of the cornerstones of organisa-
tional resilience (Hollnagel et al. 2011). ISO 31000 
monitoring and review requirements include the de-
tection of changes in the external and internal con-
text, which can require revision of risk management 
processes and the identification of emerging risks 
(NF ISO 31000). 
A change occurring within a system or in its envi-
ronment can affect safety performance in different 
ways. It can:  
− Increase or decrease the degree of risk.  
− Affect perception of risk. 
− Be at the origin of emerging risks.  
− Create new threats.  
− Increase or decrease the capacity of the system to 
respond to threats. 
− Etc. 
Managing change is generally associated with ef-
forts to overcome resistance induced by a change 
through the identification of potential sources of re-
sistance and application of the appropriate change 
management strategy. Such approaches aim to  make 
the change effective. However, several examples of 
accidents and disasters illustrate the fact that suc-
cessful changes can contribute to the occurrence of 
unwanted consequences, and research needs to be 
conducted that complements change management 
approaches with safety concerns.  
This paper presents a framework that complements 
traditional change management practices in order to 
support anticipation of the potential consequences of 
change on system safety performance. The paper is 
structured into two sections. The first relates to the 
theoretical background that structures the develop-
ment of the framework. The second presents the 
framework 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This section presents a set of theoretical issues 
aimed at structuring the development of a frame-
work for the anticipation of the consequences of 
change. The following sections discuss diversity in 
the origin of change, the diversity of technological 
systems, diversity in the consequences of change 
and the diversity of safety dimensions that can be af-
fected by change. 
2.1 Diversity of sources of change 
Sources of change can be structured using a 
framework composed of six dimensions. Four of 
these dimensions relate to the description of the in-
ternal parts of an organization (its social structure, 
technology, physical structure and culture) and the 
other two to its environment (organizational and 
general) (Hatch, 1997). 
Social structure is related to all the means used to 
divide work into distinct tasks and to allow 
coordination of their execution. This complex sys-
tem is the result of a combination of the formal 
structure and real interactions between agents of the 
organization. Formal structure is generally described 
as exchanges between strategic top levels, 
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hierarchical reporting lines, operational centers, 
technological structures and logistic supports.  
Technology is related to the means used to 
achieve a result (an objective, a product, a service, 
etc.). It includes physical objects or artifacts (prod-
ucts, tools, production means, etc.), processes and 
knowledge necessary for the development and use of 
equipment, tools and methods. 
Organizational culture designates a set of mean-
ings that are publicly accepted and collectively vali-
dated by a specific group at a given moment. Orga-
nizational culture includes beliefs, hypotheses, 
values, norms and artifacts that structure decisions 
and actions in the organization.  
Physical structure concerns the relationships be-
tween different physical elements of the organiza-
tion (buildings, technological devices, furniture, 
etc.). It includes the spatial localization of the differ-
ent facilities of the organization, the logistic network 
between them and the internal layout of offices and 
production means. 
The organizational environment designates enti-
ties that are in direct interaction with the organiza-
tion. It can include economic entities (clients, sup-
pliers, subcontractors, competitors, trade unions, 
banks, etc.), institutional entities (regulatory bodies, 
economic facilitators, etc.) and entities that are situ-
ated in the same spatial area (industrial facilities, 
residential areas, rivers, forests, etc.).  
The general environment is related to general for-
ces that can have an impact on the organization. Dif-
ferent sectors can be distinguished:  
− The social sector relates to mechanisms that 
structure social behavior (demography, mobility 
model, lifestyle, etc.).  
− The cultural sector relates to history, culture, tra-
ditions and values which structure the decisions 
and actions of the business.  
− The legal sector is dedicated to the constitution 
and laws governing territories where the organi-
zation acts.  
− The political sector relates to the separation and 
concentration of powers and the nature of the po-
litical system in the countries where the organiza-
tion is active.  
− The economic sector relates to the job, financial, 
goods and services markets.  
− The technological sector relates to knowledge and 
information resulting from scientific progress.  
− The physical sector relates to nature and natural 
resources (coal, oil, pollution levels, climatic 
conditions, etc.). 
 
All of these systems can be at the origin of a 
change (new strategy, new procedures, new tech-
nology, new organizational identity, new facili-
ties, new regulations, etc.) and be affected by it.  
2.2 Diversity of technological change 
Technological system diversity can be captured by 
two typologies (Parasuraman et al. 2000). The first 
is related to the type of functions potentially per-
formed by a technological system. They can be di-
vided into four types: 
− Information acquisition. Automation is applied to 
the sensing and registration of input data.  
− Information analysis. Automation is applied to in-
ferential processes for data extrapolation over 
time or prediction. 
− Decision and selection of actions. Automation is 
applied to the definition of alternatives and selec-
tion of the one that is most suitable. 
− Action implementation. Automation is used to 
execute a set of actions 
 
The second typology is related to the balance be-
tween automation and operator functions for the ex-
ecution of a task. There are ten levels that range 
from high- to low-level automation, namely: the 
computer decides everything and acts autonomously, 
ignoring any human intervention (10); it informs the 
human only if it – the computer – decides to (9); it 
informs the human only if asked (8); it acts auto-
matically, then must inform the human (7); it allows 
the human a limited amount of time to veto the ac-
tion before automatic execution (6); it executes ac-
tions only if the human approves (5); it suggests an 
alternative action (4); it narrows the selection of ac-
tions down to a few (3); it offers a comprehensive 
set of decision/ action alternatives (2); it offers no 
assistance – the human must make all decisions and 
take all actions (1). 
These two typologies capture the diversity of the 
nature of technological systems and they can be used 
to support a definition of the nature of the changes 
occurring in an organization. Nevertheless, other 
factors are necessary in order to capture the diversity 
of technological change: 
− Purpose. The qualitative and quantitative reasons 
that motivated the change (enhancement or reduc-
tion of performance criteria, technological inno-
vation, etc.). 
− Justification. Elements that support the change 
and its impact.  
− Position. Changes that take place in the context of 
the system: endogenous change (which occurs 
within the system studied) or exogenous (which 
occurs outside the system being studied). 
− Magnitude. The scope of the change within the 
system being studied: changing one dimension of 
the system or changing the overall structure of the 
system. 
− Timings. Steps, times and transitions constituting 
the process of change. 
− Direction. The overall strategic context in which 
change takes place (linked to purpose). 
− Stability. The change may be permanent or tran-
sient (i.e. depending on a given state of the envi-
ronment). 
− Delay. The time that elapses before the effects of 
the change can be seen. 
 
These factors make it possible to consider the 
variety of technological change. The next section is 
related to diversity in the consequences of change. 
2.3 Diversity in the consequences of change 
Technological systems and human performance in a 
complex system can lead to different types of conse-
quences that are related to initial goals, specifica-
tions (for technological systems), intention (for hu-
mans) and interactions and feedback with the 
environment in which they take place (Merton 1936, 
Morin 1990). 
Change can lead to: 
− Positive, unexpected benefits usually referred to 
as serendipity or a windfall. 
− Negative effects, which occur in addition to the 
desired effect of the change. 
− Perverse effects, i.e. the unexpected adverse ef-
fect is greater than the expected beneficial effect 
− Futility of innovation, e.g. the more things 
change, the more they stay the same 
− Threat of achievements (we wanted to improve 
society, but only succeeded in removing freedoms 
and safety). 
 
Several factors can explain these unexpected con-
sequences: 
− Ignorance: It is impossible to anticipate every-
thing, thereby leading to an incomplete analysis. 
− Error: An incorrect analysis of the problem or fol-
lowing habits that have worked in the past but 
may not apply to the current situation.  
− Immediate interest: This may override long-term 
interests.  
− Basic values: These may require or prohibit cer-
tain actions even if the long-term result might be 
unfavorable. 
− Self-defeating prophecy or fear of consequences: 
These drive people to find solutions before a 
problem occurs, thus the non-occurrence of the 
problem is unanticipated. 
 
Those concepts help to describe the diversity of 
potential consequences of a change. The next section 
describes the different dimensions to be taken into 
account when considering the consequences of 
change on safety performance. 
2.4 Diversity of safety dimensions affected by 
change 
This section describes different safety-based di-
mensions in order to capture the diversity of the con-
sequences of a technological change on safety per-
formance. Four dimensions are considered: risk, 
human factors, organizational resilience and inter-
organizational. 
Risk is related to the potential failure of a techno-
logical system, its probability and the gravity of the 
consequences.  
Human factors are related to human non-technical 
skills that can be affected by the technological sys-
tem: situational awareness, communication, stress, 
fatigue, decision-making, etc. (Flin et al. 2008). 
Organisational resilience is related to the set of 
capacities that contribute to the organisation’s ability 
to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or follow-
ing changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unex-
pected conditions (Hollnagel et al. 2011). 
The inter-organisational dimension is related to 
the set of systems that interact with the organisation 
and that can be at the origin of unexpected conse-
quences. Such systems can be the legal system, 
population, clients, suppliers and competitors, enti-
ties situated in the same geographical area, etc. (Ri-
naldi et al. 2001). 
The diversity of technological system change, the 
consequences of change and safety dimensions have 
to be taken in account in a technological assessment 
process.  
Existing approaches do not focus on managing 
successful change taking in account the safety di-
mension, nor are they based on traditional risk as-
sessment methods such as Failure Mode Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), the Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) or fault tree 
analysis. Such approaches make it possible to 
consider a set of consequences but present 
limitations regarding, among others things, the com-
plexity of human behaviours and large-scale socio-
technical systems. 
The next section describes elements related to a 
technological assessment and the identification of 
consequences. 
2.5 Technological assessment 
The technological assessment (Westrum, 1991) 
relates to practices which aim to systematically con-
sider the potential consequences of a change.  
The technological assessment process can be 
structured in two steps.  
 
− Step 1. Broad Outline. This broad outline 
characterizes the nature of the change being stud-
ied; it identifies some of the consequences of 
change and thus the potential targets and 
stakeholders who would be affected by the 
change.  
− Step 2. Consequences Assessment. The represen-
tative group constituted as a result of Step 1 then 
undertakes a set of exercises designed to help 
them identify and imagine future consequences.  
Among the potential techniques that can be used 
to identify the consequences of change, some com-
monly used methods are:  
− Mathematical modeling, simulation and trend 
analysis. These techniques attempt to provide 
formal computer models that are sufficiently spe-
cific to enable quantitative predictions. 
− Technological forecasting. Here the emphasis is 
on predicting the development of technology and 
assessing the potential for it to be adopted, in-
cluding a market analysis.  
− Cross-impact analysis. Because technologies have 
interactive effects, realistic forward planning 
must consider the multiple potential impacts of 
technologies on society. The state of society in 
which the technology in question will be used 
must be considered.  
− Scenario building. Definition of plausible action 
sequences used to facilitate consideration of un-
foreseen possibilities.  
− Gaming. Gaming forces planners to take account 
of the actions of others who, as in real life, are 
likely to do surprising things.  
− Delphi methods. A Delphi procedure provides a 
method of pooling expert opinion, and in its more 
sophisticated forms it forces experts to re-
examine their own opinion in the light of possi-
bilities raised or assessments made by others. The 
key is not simply to create an “average” assess-
ment, but rather to provide a spectrum of opinions 
and their rationales.  
 
A set of basic questions form the foundation for 
the technology assessment.  
− How will the technology evolve? An assessment 
must determine what will happen to the technol-
ogy itself. How much is it likely to change? Will 
it become cheaper? More efficient? Will competi-
tive technologies spin off from it? 
− What will the technology be used for? Often the 
answer to this question is not clear at the outset, 
but it has a great deal to with overall impacts.  
− Who are the users? The primary impact of a new 
technology is felt by its users. Determining who 
they are likely to be allows us to answer many 
other questions.  
− Who will decide how the technology will be 
used? Knowing who will sponsor a technology is 
valuable in anticipating its development; knowing 
who will resist it is equally important.  
 
Requisite Imagination theory (Adamski & 
Westrum 2003), which is defined as the “art of an-
ticipating what might go wrong” offers a framework 
dedicated to the support of change assessment. This 
framework is structured into eleven cognitive tasks: 
− Clarify the task. Knowledge of the context of task 
design (purpose, technical demands, operators, 
etc.) has to be taken into account in the assess-
ment process. 
− Consider the organization. The organization and 
its management can negatively influence, delay or 
lead to the cancellation of planned changes. Or-
ganizational issues (customers and users, required 
and available resources, evaluation, people who 
have and don’t have the authority to modify the 
project, the ultimate decision maker, etc.) have to 
be taken into consideration.  
− Align Designer/User Worlds. Designers and users 
rarely shared the same representation of the task. 
User issues such as the typical perception of the 
task, its purpose and outcome; knowledge and 
skills required to complete the task; differences 
between novice, intermediate and expert users; 
user’s perceptions of constraints and limitations; 
and feedback etc., have to be taken into consid-
eration.  
− Consider the operational domain. The specificity 
of the environment and the context of the system 
where actions takes place are different from one 
domain to another and have to be taken into ac-
count in the assessment.  
− Survey past failures. Lessons can be learned from 
the past. Integrating historical reviews and failure 
analyses can prevent failures involving equip-
ment, procedures, human and organizational fac-
tors or training.  
− Minimize “switchology”. The inappropriate use of 
controls (switches, buttons, levers, etc.) is a 
source of performance errors. Controls may not 
work the way they were intended, working condi-
tions (light, time of day, etc.) may lead to diffi-
culty in using controls.  
− Account for human error. The different typologi-
es of human error can be used as foundation for 
unexpected scenario design.  
− Consider information needs. The nature and the 
quality of information required by actors in order 
to achieve their task must be identified and as-
sessed. 
− Examine procedures. Procedures related to task 
design must be studied in order to prevent side ef-
fects related to wrong interpretations by users.  
− Consider convention. Conventions used in the 
system context must be identified in order to pre-
vent failures related to their use.  
− Review constraints. All internal and external con-
straints that can influence the task design process 
have to be identified and taken into account in the 
process of identifying what can go wrong in the 
new system. 
 
Managing the change process has to consider 
the complexity of the consequences of change on 
an organization in order to facilitate positive re-
sults and prevent unwanted consequences.  
3 THE IMPACT METHOD 
The IMPACT method provides a set of recom-
mendations for a change process management. It 
is based on an analysis of the potential conse-
quences and opportunities or risk. Consequences 
are identified through the application of an as-
sessment strategy that is defined alongside an ex-
amination of the change considered.  
Application of the method is based on methodo-
logical guidelines describing the different steps to 
be achieved and a toolbox describing data acquisi-
tion processes and performance indicator assess-
ment guidelines. 
3.1 Methodological guidelines 
The IMPACT method is based on four phases.  
− Phase 1: General Outline. This phase 
describes the knowledge necessary to under-
stand the technological change studied and 
defines a strategy dedicated to the identifica-
tion of its potential consequences. The strat-
egy is based on the selection of a set of rele-
vant assessment targets. 
− Phase 2: Consequence identification. The 
purpose of this phase is to identify potential 
consequences of the change in question by ap-
plying the assessment strategy defined in the 
first phase. The result of this phase will be a 
list of potential consequences.  
− Phase 3: Risks and opportunities analysis. 
This phase evaluates the risks and the 
opportunities associated with the change in 
question. The set of consequences identified 
in the previous step is looked at and a list of 
potential risks and opportunities is defined.  
− Phase 4: Recommendations for decision-
making. The purpose of the last phase is to de-
fine a set of recommendations for change de-
sign and management processes based on the 
analysis of the set of risks and opportunities 
identified in the previous step.  
In order to support the application of the method, 
a set of methodological guidelines related to the 
information acquisition process and the perform-
ance dimension assessment is suggested.  
3.2 Toolbox 
The IMPACT toolbox consists of two 
methodological guidelines: data collection processes 
and performance indicator assessment processes. 
These processes provide assessment modules to be 
applied during the consequences assessment phase 
of the method.  
In the operational version, there are three types of 
data collection processes:  
− Risk assessment. Traditional risk assessment pro-
cesses based on different methods (FMECA, 
HAZOP, THERP, CREAM, etc.). 
− Focus groups. Focus groups is an approach that 
consists of asking a group of people about their 
feelings, opinions, and beliefs concerning an idea, 
a concept, a product, etc. 
− Simulation. Simulation can be an efficient way to 
identify the consequences of a change on a sys-
tem. Simple role-playing games or more elaborate 
simulations using technological facilities such as 
bridge, flight or crisis management simulators can 
be used in order to acquire information about the 
consequence of a change by, for example, com-
paring the execution of a given scenario with and 
without the application of the change.  
 
Four levels of performance indicators are sug-
gested:  
− Risk based consequences. Consequences related 
to technical, human or organisational failure 
modes.  
− Human- and organisational-based consequences. 
The consequences related to human and organiza-
tional factors approaches include: non-technical 
skills definition and assessment; research and de-
velopment activities, e.g. situation awareness, de-
cision-making, communication, teamwork, lead-
ership, stress, fatigue (Flin et al. 2008); control 
performance assessment (Hollnagel & Woods 
2005); and risk governance e.g. pre-assessment, 
management, appraisal, characterization, evalua-
tion and communication (Renn & Walker 2008). 
− High Reliability Organisations (HRO) and Resili-
ence Engineering-based consequences. Conse-
quences identified by safety science research in-
clude: organizational resilience capabilities, e.g. 
Respond, Learn, Monitor and Anticipate (Holl-
nagel et al. 2011); HRO abilities for the manage-
ment of unexpected situations, e.g. Preoccupation 
with failure, Reluctance to simplify interpreta-
tions, Sensitivity to operations, Commitment to 
resilience, Deference to expertise (Weick & Sut-
cliffe 2001); and the Efficiency Thoroughness 
Tradeoff model i.e. Work ETTO, Psychological 
ETTO, and Organizational ETTO (Hollnagel 
2009). 
4 CONCLUSION 
The objective of the IMPACT framework is to in-
tegrate safety dimensions into change management 
and technological assessment processes.  
Some initial methodological guidelines were de-
veloped using a modular approach that integrates 
different data collection processes and performance 
indicators.  
This framework was tested in the context of an 
assessment of the potential consequences of the use 
of a 3D Chart for navigation functions. A focus 
group was organized with representatives from mari-
time systems and a set of bridge simulations based 
on a search and rescue mission was carried out using 
the use of Stress, Control and Situation Awareness 
assessment modules.  
It is currently being tested in the assessment of 
potential consequences associated with the use of 
UAS and automated threat recognition software for 
pipeline monitoring. A focus group was organized 
with representatives of pipeline monitoring systems 
and a set of role-playing games attempted to identify 
stakeholders.  
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